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Conflict and Coordination in the Provision of Public Goods: A Conceptual Analysis of Continuous and Step-Level Games

✍ Scribed by Abele, S.; Stasser, G.; Chartier, C.

Book ID: 119986131
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Year: 2010
Tongue: English
Weight: 619 KB
Volume: 14
Category: Article
ISSN: 1088-8683
DOI: 10.1177/1088868310368535

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