Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises

✍ Scribed by Glenn Herald Snyder; Paul Diesing

• Publisher: Princeton University Press
• Year: 2015
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 595
• Series: Princeton Legacy Library; 1597
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

How do nations act in a crisis? This book seeks to answer that question both theoretically and historically. It tests and synthesizes theories of political behavior by comparing them with the historical record. The authors apply theories of bargaining, game theory, information processing, decision-making, and international systems to case histories of sixteen crises that occurred during a seventy-five year period. The result is a revision and integration of diverse concepts and the development of a new empirical theory of international conflict.

Originally published in 1978.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

✦ Table of Contents

Cover
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Preface
Glossary
I. International Crises and International Theory
The Anatomy of International Crises
Systems, Bargaining, Decision Making: A Theoretical Synopsis
II. Formal Models of Bargaining
Utility Models
Models of Strategic Interaction
Empirical Interpretation and Evaluation of Utility Models
Empirical Interpretation and Evaluation of Game Models: 2x2 Games
Empirical Interpretation and Evaluation of Game Models: Expanded Game and Metagame Models
The International Supergame
Summary
III. Crisis Bargaining: Strategies and Tactics
Value Structures
Bargaining Power
The Bargaining Process: Coercion, Accommodation, Persuasion
Dimensions of Crisis Management
Coercive: Win vs. Risk-Avoidance
Accommodative: Settlement vs. Loss-Avoidance
Publicity vs. Secrecy
The Mix of Coercion and Accommodation
Summary
IV. Information Processing
Coddington's Bargaining Theory
Analysis of the Model
Initial Images and Expectations
Jervis on Information Processing
Information Processing in Crises
The Adjustment of Expectations and Images
A Revised Bargaining Model
V. Decision Making
Theories of Decision Making
Initial Strategy Decisions
Revising or Replacing a Strategy
Summary of Empirical Findings
Bounded Rationality and Game Theory
VI. Crises and International Systems
Systems Structures
Crises in Multipolar Systems
Crises in Bipolar Systems
The Impact of Nuclear Technology
Crises and the "New Multipolarity"
VII Summary and Synthesis
The Theoretical Synthesis
Crisis Bargaining: General Summary
Game Models and Crisis Structures
The Bargaining Process: Strategies and Tactics
Information Processing
Crisis Outcomes: Peaceful Resolution and War
System Structure and Crisis Bargaining
External Bargaining and Internal Bargaining
Conclusion
Appendix: Case Summaries
Index