Complex Social and Behavioral Systems: Game Theory and Agent-Based Models

✍ Scribed by Marilda Sotomayor, David Perez-Castrillo, Filippo Castiglione

• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 2020
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 940
• Series: Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Series
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

This volume in the Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, Second Edition, combines the main features of Game Theory, covering most of the fundamental theoretical aspects under the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches, with the procedures of Agent-Based Modeling for studying complex systems composed of a large number of interacting entities with many degrees of freedom. In Game Theory, the cooperative approach focuses on the possible outcomes of the decision-makers’ interaction by abstracting from the "rational" actions or decisions that may lead to these outcomes. The non-cooperative approach focuses on the actions that the decision-makers can take. As John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern argued in their path-breaking book of 1944 entitled Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, most economic questions should be analyzed as games. The models of game theory are abstract representations of a number of real-life situations and have applications to economics, political science, computer science, evolutionary biology, social psychology, and law among others. Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) is a relatively new computational modeling paradigm which aims to construct the computational counterpart of a conceptual model of the system under study on the basis of discrete entities (i.e., the agent) with some properties and behavioral rules, and then to simulate them in a computer to mimic the real phenomena. Given the relative immaturity of this modeling paradigm, and the broad spectrum of disciplines in which it is applied, a clear cut and widely accepted definition of high level concepts of agents, environment, interactions and so on, is still lacking. This volume explores the state-of-the-art in the development of a real ABM ontology to address the epistemological issues related to this emerging paradigm for modeling complex systems.

✦ Table of Contents

Series Preface
Volume Preface
Contents
About the Editor-in-Chief
Biography
Education
About the Volume Editors
Contributors
Part I: Game Theory
Game Theory, Introduction to
Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets)
Glossary
Definition of the Subject
Introduction
Stable Sets in Abstract Games
Stable Set and Core
Stable Sets in Characteristic Function Form Games
Applications of Stable Sets in Abstract and Characteristic Function Form Games
Symmetric Voting Games
General Voting Games
Production Market Games
Assignment Games
Marriage Games
House Barter Games
Farsighted Stable Sets in a General Setting
The Model
The Largest Consistent Set and the Largest Farsighted Conservative Stable Set
Applications of Farsighted Stable Sets in Strategic Form Games
Prisoner´s Dilemma
n-Person Prisoner´s Dilemma
Provision of Discrete Public Goods
Duopoly Market Games
Some General Results for Strategic Form Games
Further Research on (Myopic and Farsighted) Stable Sets in Strategic Form Games
Farsighted Stable Sets in Cooperative Games
Characteristic Function Form Games and Coalitional Sovereignty
Network Formation Games
Coalition Formation Games
Hedonic Games
General Model
Marriage Games and Roommate Games
House Barter Games
Future Directions
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
Cooperative Games
Glossary
Definition of the Subject
Introduction
Cooperative Games
Representations of Games. The Characteristic Function
Assumptions on the Characteristic Function
Solution Concepts
The Core
Non-Emptiness
The Connections with Competitive Equilibrium
Axiomatic Characterizations
Non-cooperative Implementation
An Application
The Shapley Value
Axiomatics
The Connections with Competitive Equilibrium
Non-cooperative Implementation
An Application
Future Directions
Bibliography
Primary Literature
Books and Reviews
Dynamic Games with an Application to Climate Change Models
Glossary
Definition of the Subject
Introduction
The Dynamic - or Stochastic - Game Model
Set-Up
Histories and Strategies
Equilibrium
The Dynamic - or Stochastic - Game: Results
Existence
Characterization
Folk Theorem
Feasible Payoffs
Individually Rational Payoffs
Dynamics
Global Climate Change - Issues, Models
Issues
Models
Global Climate Change - Results
Global Pareto Optima
A Markov-Perfect Equilibrium: Business as Usual´´ Comparison of the GPO and Business as Usual All SPE Generalizations Future Directions Bibliography Static Games Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction Nash Equilibrium Analysis of Some Finite Games Existence Mixed Strategies The War of Attrition (cont.) Equilibrium in Beliefs Correlated Equilibrium Rationality, Correlated Equilibrium and Equilibrium in Beliefs Rationality and Correlated Equilibrium Bayesian Games The Asymmetric Information Version of the War of Attrition Evolutionary Stable Strategies Future Directions Bibliography Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games Definition of the Subject Introduction Example Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Basic Properties Definition Canonical Representation Duality and Existence Geometric Properties Complexity Foundations Correlated Equilibrium and Communication Correlated Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Strategic Form Correlated Equilibrium Communication Equilibrium Correlated Equilibrium, Communication Equilibrium, and Cheap Talk Related Topics and Future Directions Bibliography Primary Literature Books and Reviews Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information Definition Introduction Harsanyi´s Model: The Notion of Type Aumann´s Model Harsanyi´s Model and Hierarchies of Beliefs The Universal Belief Space Belief Subspaces Examples of Belief Subspaces Consistent Beliefs and Common Priors Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium Bayesian Equilibrium The Harsanyi Game Revisited Examples of Bayesian Equilibria Bayesian Equilibrium and Correlated Equilibrium Concluding Remarks and Future Directions The Consistency Assumption Knowledge and Beliefs Future Directions Acknowledgments Bibliography Repeated Games with Complete Information Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction Games with Observable Actions Data of the Game, Strategies, and Payoffs Data of the Stage Game Repeated Game Other Strategy Specifications Induced Plays Preferences Equilibrium Notions Necessary Conditions on Equilibrium Payoffs Infinitely Patient Players Impatient Players Nash Reversion The Recursive Structure The Folk Theorem for Discounted Games Finitely Repeated Games The Prisoner´s Dilemma Games with Unique Nash Payoff Folk Theorems for Finitely Repeated Games Games with Non-observable Actions Model Data of the Game Perfect Monitoring Almost-Perfect Monitoring Canonical Structure Public and Almost-Public Signals Deterministic Signals Observable Payoffs The Repeated Game Equilibrium Notions Nash Equilibria Sequential Equilibria Extensions of the Repeated Game Correlated Equilibria Communication Equilibria Detection and Identification Equivalent Actions More Informative Actions Identification of Deviators Approachability Identification Through Endogenous Communication Public Equilibria A Recursive Structure Folk Theorems for Public Equilibria Extensions The Public Part of a Signal Public Communication Private Strategies in Games with Public Monitoring Almost-Public Monitoring Almost-Perfect Monitoring General Stochastic Signals Punishment Levels Comparison of the IR Level with the MinMax Entropy Characterizations Acknowledgments Bibliography Primary Literature Books and Reviews Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Glossary and Notation Definition of the Subject and Its Importance Introduction General Definition Strategies, Payoffs, Value, and Equilibria Strategies Payoffs Value of Zero-Sum Games Equilibria of General-Sum Games The Standard Model of Aumann and Maschler Basic Tools: Splitting, Martingale, Concavification, and the Recursive Formula Nonrevealing Games Player 2 Can Guarantee the Limit Value Uniform Value: cavu Theorem T -stage Values and the Recursive Formula Vector Payoffs and Approachability Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Approachability Approachability for Player 1 Versus Excludability for Player 2 Weak Approachability Back to the Standard Model No-Regret Strategies Zero-Sum Games with Lack of Information on Both Sides Maxmin and Minmax of the Repeated Game Limit Values Correlated Initial Information Nonzero-sum Games with Lack of Information on One Side Existence of Equilibria Characterization of Equilibrium Payoffs Biconvexity and Bimartingales Nonobservable Actions Advances Future Directions Bibliography Primary Literature Books and Reviews Reputation Effects Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction An Example A Canonical Model The Stage Game The Complete Information Repeated Game The Incomplete Information Repeated Game The Reputation Bound Temporary Reputation Effects Reputation as a State Two Long-Lived Players Future Directions Bibliography Zero-Sum Two Person Games Introduction Games with Perfect Information Emptying a Box Nim Game The Game of Hex Approximate Fixed Points An Application of the Algorithm Extensive Games and Normal Form Reduction Saddle Point Mixed Strategy and Minimax Theorem Historical Remarks Solving for Value and Optimal Strategies via Linear Programming Simplex Algorithm Fictitious Play Search Games Search Games on Trees Umbrella Folding Algorithm Completely Mixed Games and Perron´s Theorem on Positive Matrices Behavior Strategies in Games with Perfect Recall Efficient Computation of Behavior Strategies Introduction Sequence Form General Minimax Theorems S-games Geometric Consequences Ky Fan-Sion Minimax Theorems Applications of Infinite Games S-games and Discriminant Analysis General Minimax Theorem and Statistical Estimation Borel´s Poker Model War Duels and Discontinuous Payoffs on the Unit Square Epilogue Acknowledgments Bibliography Stochastic Games Glossary Definition of the Subject and Its Importance Strategies, Evaluations, and Equilibria Zero-Sum Games Multiplayer Games Correlated Equilibrium Imperfect Monitoring Folk Theorems Algorithms Continuous-Time Games Additional and Future Directions Bibliography Primary Literature Books and Reviews Signaling Games Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction The Model Equilibrium The Basic Model Separating Equilibrium Multiple Equilibria and Selection Cheap Talk A Simple Cheap-Talk Game Variations on Cheap Talk Verifiable Information Communication About Intentions Applications Economic Applications Advertising Limit Pricing Bargaining Finance Reputation Signaling in Biology Political Science Future Directions Acknowledgments Bibliography Primary Literature Books and Reviews Inspection Games Glossary Definition Introduction Selected Inspection Models Passenger Ticket Control Solution Remarks Illegal Production Solution Remarks Diversion of Nuclear Material Solution Remarks Customs and Smugglers Solution Remarks Sharing Common Pool Resources Solution Remarks Future Directions Bibliography Principal-Agent Models Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction The Base Game Moral Hazard Basic Moral Hazard Model Extensions of Moral Hazard Models Repeated Moral Hazard One Principal and Several Agents Several Principals and One Agent Adverse Selection Basic Adverse Selection Model Principals Competing for Agents in Adverse Selection Frameworks Extensions of Adverse Selection Models Repeated Adverse Selection Relationships with Several Agents: Auctions Relationships with Several Agents: Other Models and Organizational Design Several Principals Models of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Future Directions Empirical Studies of Principal-Agent Models Contracts and Social Preferences Principal-Agent Markets Bibliography Primary Literature Books and Reviews Differential Games Glossary Definition of the Subject and Its Importance Introduction Qualitative and Quantitative Differential Games Qualitative Target Games Quantitative Target Games Existence of a Value for Zero Sum Differential Games Worst Case Design Impulsive Games Nonantagonist Differential Games Stochastic Differential Games Differential Games with Incomplete Information Miscellaneous Bibliography Primary Literature Books and Reviews Mechanism Design Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction Formal Model and Early Results Quasi-Linear Utilities and the VCG Mechanism The Importance of the Domain´s Dimensionality Single-Dimensional Domains Multi-dimensional Domains Budget Balancedness and Bayesian Mechanism Design Interdependent Valuations Future Directions Bibliography Auctions Glossary Introduction Second-Price Auction English Auction First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction All-Pay First-Price Auction Dutch Auction Comparing Auction Outcomes Empirics of Auctions Empirics of First-Price Auctions Empirics of Second-Price Auctions Winner´s Curse Collusive Bidding Concluding Remarks Bibliography Implementation Theory Glossary Definition Introduction Brief History of Implementation Theory The Main Concepts The Environment Social Objectives Mechanisms Equilibrium The Main Insights The Revelation Principle and Its Consequences Monotonicity and How to Avoid It The Limits of Design Unsolved Issues and Further Research Answers to the Questions Acknowledgments Bibliography Two-Sided Matching Models Glossary Definition of the Subject Basic Definitions A Brief Historical Account Gale-Shapley Algorithm with the Colleges Proposing to the Applicants Gale-Shapley Algorithm with the Applicants Proposing to the Colleges Introduction Discrete Two-Sided Matching Models Continuous Two-Sided Matching Model With Additively Separable Utility Functions Hybrid One-to-One Matching Model Incentives Future Directions Bibliography Market Design Introduction Two-Sided Matching Basic Two-Sided Matching Model Matching with Contracts One-Sided Matching House Exchange House Allocation with No Existing Owner House Allocation with Existing Owners Applications Medical Residency Matching Kidney Exchange School Choice Matching with Constraints Conclusion Bibliography Cost Sharing in Production Economies Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction Solving Cost Sharing Problems: Cost Sharing Rules Outline Cooperative Cost Games Cooperative Cost Game Incentives in Cooperative Cost Games Cooperative Solutions The Separable Cost Remaining Benefit Solution Shapley Value Egalitarian Solution Nucleolus Cost Sharing Rules Induced by Solutions Noncooperative Cost Games Strategic Demand Games Preferences over Consequences Preferences over Action Profiles Strategic Game and Nash Equilibrium Dominance in Strategic Games Demand Games Demand Revelation Games Demand Revelation Mechanisms Strategy-Proofness Efficiency and Strategy-Proof Cost Sharing Mechanisms Extension of the Model: Discrete Goods Continuous Cost Sharing Models Continuous Homogeneous Output Model, Average Cost Sharing Rule Shapley-Shubik Rule Serial Rule Decreasing Serial Rule Marginal Pricing Rule Additive Cost Sharing and Rationing Incentives in Cooperative Production Stable Allocations, Stand-Alone Core Strategic Manipulation Through Reallocation of Demands Demand Games for Nash Equilibria of Demand Games in a Simple Case Proportional Demand Game Serial Demand Game Comparison of Proportional and Serial Equilibria (I) Uniqueness of Nash Equilibria in P1-Demand Games Decreasing Returns to Scale Increasing Returns to Scale Comparison of Serial and Proportional Equilibria (II) A Word on Strategy-Proofness in Bayesian -Demand Games Continuous Heterogeneous Output Model, Extensions of Cost Sharing Rules Measurement of Scale Path-Generated Cost Sharing Rules Aumann-Shapley Rule Friedman-Moulin Rule Moulin-Shenker Rule Shapley-Shubik Rule A Numerical Example Axiomatic Characterization of Fixed-Path Rules Strategic Properties of Fixed-Path Rules Stochastic Cost Sharing Models Sharing Cost of Success and Failure of Projects Sharing a Random Cost Under Limited Liabilities Future Directions Informational Issues Budget Balance Performance Nonlinear Cost Sharing Rules Acknowledgments Bibliography Market Games and Clubs Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction Transferable Utility Games; Some Standard Definitions Essential Superadditivity A Market Market-Game Equivalence Pregames Premarkets Direct Markets and Market-Game Equivalence Equivalence of Markets and Games with Many Players Small Group Effectiveness and Per Capita Boundedness Derivation of Markets from Pregames Satisfying SGE Cores and Approximate Cores Nonemptiness and Convergence of Approximate Cores of Large Games Shapley Values of Games with Many Players Economies with Clubs With a Continuum of Players Other Related Concepts and Results Some Remarks on Markets and More General Classes of Economies Conclusions and Future Directions Bibliography Learning in Games Glossary Definition of the Subject and Its Importance Introduction Deterministic Learning Classical Learning Models Cournot Best Response Dynamics Fictitious Play Belief Learning and Bayesian Learning What ShouldConvergence´´ Mean?
Convergence in What Game?
Convergence in What Sense?
Convergence to What Sort of Equilibrium?
Convergence in Classical Learning Models
Kalai-Lehrer Learning
Universal Convergence
Sophisticated Learning
Payoff Uncertainty
Stochastic Learning
Convergence in Stochastic Learning Models
Calibration
Future Directions
Bibliography
Fair Division
Glossary
Introduction
Cutting Cakes
Dividing Indivisible Items
Conclusion
Future Directions
Bibliography
Social Choice Theory
Glossary
Definition of the Subject
Introduction
Cyclical Patterns and Arrow´s Impossibility Theorem
Sen´s Result on the Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal
Incentives: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
Escaping Impossibilities
Escaping Arrow´s Impossibility
Escaping Sen´s Paretian Liberal Paradox
Escaping the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility
Voting Rules: A Gallery of Proposals
Broader Horizons
Future Research
Bibliography
Reference Books
Voting
Definition of the Subject
Introduction
The Collective Choice Problem
Voting Rules
Welfare Economics
Arrow´s Impossibility Theorem
Political Ignorance and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
Political Competition and Strategic Voting
Political Competition
The Decision to Vote: The Paradox of Voting
Mobilization and Group-Based Notion of Welfare
The Common Value Setting with Strategic Agents
Future Directions
Bibliography
Primary Literature
Books and Reviews
Voting Procedures, Complexity of
Glossary
Definition of the Subject
Introduction
The Search for a Good´´ Voting Procedure, from Borda to Arrow Definitions, Notation, and Partially Ordered Sets Used to Model Preferences Common Voting Procedures Plurality Rule, Plurality Rule with Runoff, and Preferential Voting Procedure Borda´s Procedure and Some Variants (Nanson´s and Baldwin´s Procedures) Condorcet´s Procedure Median Orders, Condorcet-Kemeny Problem, and Slater Problem Prudent Orders, Maximin Procedure, Minimax Procedure, and Ranked Pairs Procedure Tournament Solutions Number of Wins: Copeland´s Procedure Top Cycle: Smith´s Solution Uncovered Set: Fishburn´s and Miller´s Solution Minimal Covering Set: Dutta´s Solution Maximal Transitive Subtournaments: Banks´s Solution Tournament Equilibrium Set: T. Schwartz´s Solution Dodgson´s Procedure Young´s Procedure Approval Voting Procedure, Majority-Choice Approval Procedure, and Variants Bucklin´s Procedure Complexity Results Main Complexity Classes Complexity Results for the Usual Voting Procedures Further Directions Acknowledgments Bibliography Primary Literature Books and Reviews Evolutionary Game Theory Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction Normal Form Games Static Notions of Evolutionary Stability Population Games Revision Protocols Definition Examples Imitation Protocols and Natural Selection Protocols Direct Evaluation Protocols Deterministic Dynamics Mean Dynamics Examples Evolutionary Justification of Nash Equilibrium Local Stability Global Convergence Potential Games Stable Games Perturbed Best Response Dynamics in Supermodular Games Imitation Dynamics in Dominance Solvable Games Nonconvergence Conservative Properties of the Replicator Dynamic in Zero-Sum Games Games with Nonconvergent Dynamics Chaotic Dynamics Survival of Dominated Strategies Stochastic Dynamics Deterministic Approximation Convergence to Equilibria and to Better-Reply Closed Sets Stochastic Stability and Equilibirum Selection Stochastic Stability Bernoulli Arrivals and Mutations Poisson Arrivals and Payoff Noise Stochastic Stability via Large Population Limits Local Interaction Stochastic Stability and Equilibrium Selection Revisited Complex Spatial Dynamics Applications Future Directions Acknowledgments Bibliography Networks and Stability Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction Specific Results for Pairwise Stability, Strong Stability, Nash Stability, and Farsighted Consistency The Primitives Feasible Networks Types of Networks Linking Networks Directed Networks Remarks The Feasible Set Paths and Circuits Players´ Preferences A Remark on Weak Preferences Network Payoff Functions Preference Supernetworks The Rules of Network Formation Examples of Network Formation Rules Jackson-Wolinsky Rules (1996) (Bilateral-Unilateral Rules) Jackson-van den Nouweland Rules (Jackson and van den Nouweland 2005) (Bilateral-Unilateral Rules) Bala-Goyal Rules (Bala and Goyal 2000) (Noncooperative Rules - Unilateral-Unilateral Rules) Rules Supernetworks Supernetworks Dominance Relations Direct Dominance Indirect Dominance Path Dominance > -Supernetworks Abstract Games of Network Formation and Stability Network Formation Games with Respect to Irreflexive Dominance Quasi-Stability and Stability Farsighted Consistency Network Formation Games with Respect to Path Dominance Preliminaries Networks Without Descendants Basins of Attraction Stable Sets with Respect to Path Dominance The Path Dominance Core The Path Dominance Core and Constrained Pareto Efficiency Strong Stability, Pairwise Stability, Nash Stability, and Farsighted Consistency Strongly Stable Homogeneous Networks Pairwise Stable Networks Nash Networks Farsightedly Consistent Networks Singleton Basins of Attraction Network Formation Games and Potential Functions Jackson-Wolinsky Network Formation Games Future Directions Acknowledgments Bibliography Game Theory and Strategic Complexity Glossary Definition Introduction Games, Automata, and Equilibrium Concepts Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games Endogenous Complexity Exogenous Complexity Complexity and Bargaining Complexity and the Unanimity Game Complexity and Repeated Negotiations Complexity, Market Games, and the Competitive Equilibrium Homogeneous Markets Heterogeneous Markets Complexity and Off-The-Equilibrium-Path Play Discussion and Future Directions Acknowledgments Bibliography Part II: Agent-Based Models Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation, Introduction to Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction Agent-Based Models for Simulation Agent Behavior Specification Environment Agent Interaction Platforms for Agent-Based Simulation Future Directions Bibliography Agent-Based Modeling, Mathematical Formalism for Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction Examples of Agent-Based Simulations TRANSIMS (Transportation, Analysis and Simulation System) C-ImmSim A Voting Game Existing Mathematical Frameworks Cellular Automata Hopfield Networks Communicating Finite-State Machines Finite Dynamical Systems Definitions, Background, and Examples Stochastic Finite Dynamical Systems Agent-Based Simulations as Finite Dynamical Systems Finite Dynamical Systems as Theoretical and Computational Tools A Computational View of Finite Dynamical Systems: Definitions Configuration Reachability Problem for SDSs Turing Machines: A Brief Overview How SDSs Can Mimic Turing Machines TRANSIMS-Related Questions Mathematical Results on Finite Dynamical Systems Parallel Update Systems Sequential Update Systems The Category of Sequential Dynamical Systems Future Directions Bibliography Primary Literature Logic and Geometry of Agents in Agent-Based Modeling Definition of the Subject Introduction Compositionality Some Key Points Computation as Interaction Changing Views of Computation First-Generation Models of Computation Interaction Toward a Compositional Approach to Complex Systems Toward a Logic and Geometry of Interaction Toward aLogic of Interaction´´
The Static Conception of Logic
The Copycat Strategy
A dynamic tautology
Conservation of information flow
The power of copying
The geometry of information flow
Game Semantics
Agents are Strategies
Building Complex Systems by Combining Games
Duality - Linear Negation
Tensor - Linear Conjunction
Par - Linear Disjunction
Interaction
Composition as Interaction
Discussion
Emergent Logic: The Geometry of Information Flow
Logic
Further Developments
Diagram Algebras
Temperley-Lieb Algebra
Applicative Computation
Quantum Computation
Kets, Bras, and Scalars
Bell States and Costates
Derivation of Quantum Teleportation
Further Directions
Bibliography
Primary Literature
Books and Reviews
Agent-Based Modeling and Artificial Life
Glossary
Definition of the Subject
Introduction
Artificial Life
The Essence of ALife
Self-Replication and Cellular Automata
The Game of Life
Cellular Automata Classes
Genotype/Phenotype Distinction
Information Processes
Emergence
Artificial Chemistry
Hypercycles
ALife and Computing
Artificial Life Algorithms
Evolutionary Computing
Biologically Inspired Computing
Artificial Life Algorithms and Agent-Based Modeling
ALife Summary
ALife in Agent-Based Modeling
Agent-Based Modeling Topologies
Social Agent-Based Modeling
Social Agents
Culture and Generative Social Science
ALife and Biology
From Cellular Automata to Cells
Artificial Ecologies
Adaptation and Learning in Agent-Based Models
Future Directions
Bibliography
Primary Literature
Books and Reviews
Embodied and Situated Agents, Adaptive Behavior in
Definition of the Subject
Introduction
Embodiment and Situatedness
Behavior and Cognition as Complex Adaptive Systems
Behavior and Cognition as Emergent Dynamical Properties
Behavior and Cognition as Phenomena Originating from the Interaction Between Coupled Dynamical Processes
Behavior and Cognition as Phenomena with a Multilevel and Multi-scale Organization
On the Top-Down Effect from Higher to Lower Levels of Organization
Adaptive Methods
Evolutionary Robotics Methods
Developmental Robotics Methods
The Incremental Nature of the Developmental Process
The Social Nature of the Developmental Process
Exploitation of the Interaction Between Concurrent Developmental Processes
Discussion and Conclusion
Bibliography
Interaction-Based Computing in Physics
Glossary
Definition
Introduction: Physics and Computers
From Trajectories to Statistics and Back
Newton´s Laws
Low Dimensionality
High Dimensionality
Linear Systems
Molecular Dynamics
Chaos and Probability
Discretization
Statistics
Random Walks
Time-Series Data
Markov Approximation
Mean Field
Boltzmann Equation
Equilibrium
Monte Carlo
Stochastic Optimization
Critical Phenomena
Networks
Agents
Artificial Worlds
Ising Model
Cellular Automata
Probabilistic Cellular Automata
Agent-Based Simulations
Future Directions
Bibliography
Primary Literature
Books and Reviews
Swarm Intelligence
Glossary
Definition of the Subject and Its Importance
Introduction
Biological Systems
Robotic Systems
Artificial Life Systems
Definition of Swarm
Standard-Mathematics Methods
Swarm Optimization
Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO)
Ant Colony Optimization (ACO)
Nonlinear Differential Equation Methods
Limitations of Standard-Mathematics Methods
Cellular-Computing Methods
Intelligence as Universal Computation
Relations to Standard-Mathematics Methods
Randomness in Swarm Intelligence
The Implicit Assumption of Asynchrony Irrelevance
Asynchronous Swarms
Types of Asynchrony
Modeling Asynchrony by Synchronous Swarms
Local Synchrony and Self-Synchronization
The Natural Asynchrony of Swarms
The Realization of Asynchronous Swarms
Characteristics of Swarm Intelligence
Dynamics in Swarm Intelligence
Unpredictability in Swarm Intelligence
Swarms of Intelligent Units
Future Directions
Bibliography
Primary Literature
Books and Reviews
Social Phenomena Simulation
Glossary
Definition of the Subject
Introduction
Why Simulate Social Phenomena?
Supporting Social-Theory Building
Supporting the Engineering of Systems
Supporting Planning, Policymaking, and Other Decision Making
Training
Simulating Social Phenomena
Future Directions
Bibliography
Further Reading
Agent-Based Computational Economics
Glossary
Definition of the Subject
Introduction
Some of the Pioneering Studies
Schelling´s Segregation Model
The Kim and Markowitz Portfolio Insurers Model
The Arthur, Holland, Lebaron, Palmer, and Tayler Stock Market Model
The Lux and Lux and Marchesi Model
Illustration with the LLS Model
Background
The LLS Model
Rational Informed Identical (RII) Investors
Efficient Market Believers (EMB)
Deviations from Rationality
Market Clearance
Agent-Based Simulation
Results of the LLS Model
Benchmark Case: Fully Rational and Identical Agents
No Volume
Log Prices Follow a Random Walk
No Excess Volatility
The Introduction of a Small Minority of EMB Investors
Homogeneous Subpopulation of EMBs
Heavy Trading Volume
Autocorrelation of Returns
Excess Volatility
Two Types of EMBs
Full Spectrum of EMB Investors
Return Autocorrelation: Momentum and Mean Reversion
Excess Volatility
Heavy Volume
Volume Is Positively Correlated with Contemporaneous and Lagged Absolute Returns
Discussion of the LLS Results
Summary and Future Directions
Bibliography
Primary Literature
Books and Reviews
Cellular Automaton Modeling of Tumor Invasion
Glossary
Definition of the Subject
Introduction
Cellular Automata
Models of Tumor Invasion
Invasive Tumor Morphology
Effects of Directed Cell Motion
Spatial Structure of Invasive Tumors
Tumor Cell Migration and the Influence of the Extracellular Matrix
The Role of Cell-Cell and Cell-ECM Adhesion
Cellular Mechanisms of Glioma Cell Migration
Effects of Fiber Tracts on Glioma Invasion
Effect of Heterogeneous Environments on Tumor Cell Migration
Metabolism and Acidosis
Emergence of Tumor Invasion
Influence of Metabolic Changes
The Game of Invasion
Discussion
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
Agent-Based Modeling and Computer Languages
Glossary
Definition: Agent-Based Modeling and Computer Languages
Agent-Based Modeling
Types of Computer Languages
Requirements of Computer Languages for Agent-Based Modeling
Example Computer Languages Useful for Agent-Based Modeling
Design Languages
Design Patterns
ODD Protocol
UML
Domain-Specific Languages
Business Languages
Science and Engineering Languages
Mathematica
MATLAB
Dedicated Agent-Based Modeling Languages
NetLogo
Repast Simphony Flowcharts
General Languages
General Language Toolkits
Swarm
Repast Simphony Java and Groovy
Java
C#
C++
Future Directions
Bibliography
Computer Graphics and Games, Agent-Based Modeling in
Glossary
Definition of the Subject
Introduction
Agent-Based Modelling in Computer Graphics
The Spectrum of Agents
Virtual Fidelity
Agent-Based Modelling in CGI for Movies
Agent-Based Modelling in Games
Game Genres
Implementing Agent-Based Modelling Techniques in Games
Serious Games & Academia
Future Directions
Bibliography
Primary Literature
Books and Reviews
Agent-Based Modeling, Large-Scale Simulations
Glossary
Definition of the Subject
Introduction
Large Scale Agent Based Models: Guidelines for Development
Key Considerations
A Protocol
Parallel Computing
Load Balancing
Communication Between Nodes
Blocking and Deadlocking
Example
Benefits
Pitfalls
Future Directions
Complexity and Model Analysis
Grid Computing
Dissemination of Techniques
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
Primary Literature
Books and Reviews
Index