✦ LIBER ✦

Competitive newsvendor problems with the same Nash and Stackelberg solutions

✍ Scribed by Yasemin Serin

Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2007
Tongue: English
Weight: 215 KB
Volume: 35
Category: Article
ISSN: 0167-6377
DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2006.01.002

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis

Consider two newsvendors: (i) they compete satisfying substitutable demands searching Nash equilibrium or (ii) one is the leader deciding first, the other responds optimally playing a Stackelberg game. The leader profits more than she does in (i). We present conditions under which the leader's profit does not improve from (i) to (ii).