✦ LIBER ✦

Competitive Lobbying and Supermajorities in a Majority-rule Institution

✍ Scribed by David P. Baron

Book ID: 111007914
Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
Year: 2006
Tongue: English
Weight: 355 KB
Volume: 108
Category: Article
ISSN: 0347-0520
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00461.x

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in

A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings

✍ BERNHEIM, B. D.; SLAVOV, S. N. 📂 Article 📅 2009 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 277 KB

Vertical tax competition and consumption

Vertical tax competition and consumption externalities in a federation with lobbying

✍ Alejandro Esteller-Moré; Umberto Galmarini; Leonzio Rizzo 📂 Article 📅 2012 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 320 KB

Professionals and students in a lobbying

Professionals and students in a lobbying experiment: Professional rules of conduct and subject surrogacy

✍ Jan Potters; Frans van Winden 📂 Article 📅 2000 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 183 KB

Simulation of global and local intransit

Simulation of global and local intransitivities in a simple voting game under majority rule

✍ Eric C. Browne; Peggy A. James; Martin A. Miller 📂 Article 📅 1991 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 748 KB

Maintaining social identity in a mixed-g

Maintaining social identity in a mixed-gender setting: Minority/majority status and cooperative/competitive feedback

✍ Raymond T. Garza; Jill E. Borchert 📂 Article 📅 1990 🏛 Springer US 🌐 English ⚖ 768 KB

Majority rule outcomes and the structure

Majority rule outcomes and the structure of debate in one-issue-at-a-time decision-making

✍ Scott L. Feld; Bernard Grofman 📂 Article 📅 1988 🏛 Springer US 🌐 English ⚖ 665 KB

In many group decision-making situations, such as faculty hiring decisions, outcomes are often arrived at by deciding one issue at a time (e.g., first rank, then subfield). It is well known that procedures limiting votes to separate orthogonal dimensions always result in a unique outcome at the gene