Recently Richard Swinburne has argued that the well-known Free Will Defense can provide an explanation of God's permitting moral evil (i.e., evil intentionally brought about by human agents) only if there is also natural evil (i.e., evil not intentionally brought about by human agents). 1 Ultimately
β¦ LIBER β¦
Compatibilism, Evil, and the Free-Will Defense
β Scribed by A. A. Howsepian
- Book ID
- 107525431
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Year
- 2007
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 268 KB
- Volume
- 46
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0038-1527
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
Natural evil and the Free Will Defense
β
Paul K. Moser
π
Article
π
1984
π
Springer Netherlands
π
English
β 471 KB
Free Will and Determinism: Why Compatibi
β
Gregory Hardingβ
π
Article
π
1997
π
Springer
π
English
β 207 KB
The free will defence and natural evil
β
Michael J. Coughlan
π
Article
π
1986
π
Springer Netherlands
π
English
β 790 KB
Does the granting of free will demand not only that moral evil must be possible, but also that natural evil exist? A positive answer to this question has been offered by Richard Swinburne, who has argued that an agent cannot have free will (in the relevant moral sense) without knowledge of how to br
The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral
β
Michael S. McKenna
π
Article
π
1998
π
Springer Netherlands
π
English
β 96 KB
Plantinga on the Free Will Defense
β
Hugh LaFollette
π
Article
π
1980
π
Springer Netherlands
π
English
β 513 KB
Transworld sanctity and Plantinga's Free
β
Daniel Howard-Snyder; John O'Leary-Hawthorne
π
Article
π
1998
π
Springer Netherlands
π
English
β 96 KB