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Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

✍ Scribed by Yuval Heller; Eilon Solan; Tristan Tomala

Book ID
116506371
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2012
Tongue
English
Weight
224 KB
Volume
74
Category
Article
ISSN
0899-8256

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πŸ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES

The evolution of type communication in a
The evolution of type communication in a sender/receiver game of common interest with cheap talk
✍ Jasmina Arifovic; B.Curtis Eaton πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 1998 πŸ› Elsevier Science 🌐 English βš– 256 KB

We use a genetic algorithm to simulate play of a sender/receiver game of common interest in which players engage in anonymous, pairwise interactions. The order of an equilibrium is the number of player types that are communicated. There are many equilibria of each order, equilibria of the same order