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Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal–Supervisor–Agent Relationship

✍ Scribed by Roland Strausz

Book ID: 108535389
Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
Year: 1997
Tongue: English
Weight: 103 KB
Volume: 99
Category: Article
ISSN: 0347-0520
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00078

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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