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Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy (Kittay/Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy) || Equality, Freedom, and/or Justice for All: A Response to Martha Nussbaum

โœ Scribed by Kittay, Eva Feder; Carlson, Licia


Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
Year
2010
Weight
531 KB
Category
Article
ISBN
1405198281

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

โœฆ Synopsis


this reply to Martha Nussbaum's ''The Capabilities of People with Disabilities,'' I will start by picking up the gauntlet where Nussbaum has thrown it. ''People with cognitive disabilities are equal citizens,'' she writes. ''Now we must take the most controversial step of all, giving people with disabilities political and civil rights on a basis of genuine equality. . . . Let the debate begin.'' In this chapter, I want to move the debate forward in two ways: first, by largely agreeing with Nussbaum's argument, even where it is most controversialFthat is, at the end, where Nussbaum calls for a robust conception of surrogacy that would extend even to such matters as voting and serving on juries (though I have some reservations about jury service, which I'll explain below); second, by noting that this conception of surrogacy poses an underrecognized challenge to disability studies. But I would be remiss if I did not remark at the outset that Nussbaum's willingness to take cognitive disability as a challenge for moral philosophy has been exemplary. A decade ago, Eva Kittay and I were complaining to each other that philosophy had so little to say on the subjectFexcept, of course, when philosophers busy themselves with finding reasons why people with cognitive disabilities do not meet their standards for entities entitled to something called human dignity. So for some years now, I've been in the position of saying to my colleagues in philosophy, ''Your silence with regard to cognitive disability is most dismaying,'' followed in short order by ''Actually, your undervaluation of the lives of people with cognitive disabilities is even more dismaying. I liked you all better when you were silent.'' My first response to Nussbaum, accordingly, is simply to say that I'm grateful for her work on disability, grateful for the way she has taken the subject as a challenge to the capabilities approach to theories of justice, and grateful that she even has taken the example of my son, Jamie, as one of the foundations for the argument she elaborates in Frontiers of Justice. I'm grateful also for the chance to offer an update on the ways Jamie challenges our thinking about cognitive disability.


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