The aim of the authors (Mick Power and Tim Dalgleish), and the main tenet of the book, is to provide an all encompassing theory of emotion and with this in mind an overview of the 'basic' emotions, including how they can be related to various emotional disorders. Now in its second edition, the authors assimilate and review theories of emotion that have gone before, in order to present a modern approach to understanding emotional order and disorder; namely, a goal-based 'Schematic, Propositional, Analogue, Associative, Representational Systems' approach or 'SPAARS' model of emotion. This approach, although based on current psychological perspectives of emotion and emotional disorder, is firmly grounded in Aristotelian roots in that a broadly functionalist framework is adopted. Or rather, that a cognitive theory (of appraisal) is essential for the understanding of emotion.
Given its purpose, the book is structured in such a way that the earlier chapters are concerned with a comprehensive review of the philosophy and theories of emotion and emotional disorders (culminating with the introduction of the SPAARS approach in Chapter 5), while the latter chapters are concerned with the basic emotions and disorders which have emerged from this literature. These latter chapters include discussions of how models of emotion, especially the SPAARS model, can account for the patterns of thoughts and behaviours observed in such disorders. Therefore, the first half of the book is concerned with the cognitive philosophy of emotion (Chapter 2), cognitive theories of emotion (Chapter 3) and cognitive theories of emotional disorder (Chapter 4), while the second part is concerned with the emotions of fear, sadness, anger, disgust and happiness, and disorders associated with each, or a combination of these emotions (Chapters 6-10, respectively).
To all intents and purposes, the crux of the book is Chapter 5 and the introduction to the SPAARS approach, thus the reader should devote much time to this chapter. Indeed, whilst the SPAARS approach is an eloquently developed theory (based on a thorough review of the literature presented before it), to fully comprehend the intricacies and complexities of this theory, the reader must take their time with this chapter. To briefly summarise, the SPAARS approach is exactly what it states: Schematic, Propositional, Analogical and Associative Representational Systems, which lead to the experience (or concept) of an emotion, although not necessarily in this order. That is, whilst the different representational systems can be simultaneously activated and also feed into each other (i.e. SPAARS is multi-layered), the analogical system (which in its simplest format is akin to some sort of 'event'-perceptual or otherwise) is a necessary prerequisite for representations at the 'higher' propositional, analogical and associative levels. As such, the main advantage of the SPAARS approach to emotion is its flexibility.
Unlike many theories of emotion that have gone before it, the SPAARS approach is not limited to explanations of 'healthy' emotion (i.e. emotional order), nor to explanations of 'unhealthy' emotion (i.e. emotional disorder; e.g. Wells, 2000) which tend to be selective in their applicability (e.g. Beck's Cognitive Theory of Depression, 1967Depression, , 1983)). Nor does it purport that emotions are only driven by cognitive appraisals (which is the domain of the schematic model level). Rather, within SPAARS, emotions can also be generated via a second associative route, an automatised route in which cognitive appraisals are by-passed (although at some prior point in the history of the individual/ species, appraisal would have been necessary). Thus, what the SPAARS approach offers is a plausible and comprehensive explanation of: (i) emotions and (ii) a range of emotional disorders (e.g. panic, PTSD, phobia, depression, mania) generally associated with these emotions.
Saying this, by the authors' own admission, coverage from an affective neuroscience perspective is minimal (p. xi), and coming from an affective neuroscience standpoint myself, I cannot say that all the ideas and theories proposed by Power and Dalgleish fit comfortably with my own epistemological APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY