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Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application

✍ Scribed by Akira Okada

Book ID: 116506343
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2011
Tongue: English
Weight: 178 KB
Volume: 73
Category: Article
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.008

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