Coalition convex preference orders are almost surely convex
โ Scribed by R.Daniel Mauldin
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1986
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 172 KB
- Volume
- 114
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0022-247X
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
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