Checking Her Cherry, Too

✍ Scribed by Sarah Sethline

• Year: 2014
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 43 KB
• Category: Fiction

✦ Synopsis

1. The Too Big to Fail Doctrines -- 1.1 The meaning and origin of TBTF -- 1.2 Rewarding recklessness: An anecdote -- 1.3 TBTF: A privilege of banks and other financial institutions -- 1.4 The pros and cons of financial regulation -- 1.5 TBTF as an extension of the banking safety net -- 2. The History of TBTF -- 2.1 Financial crises and regulation -- 2.2 The history of deregulation -- 2.3 Evolution of the TBTF doctrine -- 2.4 TBTF rescue during the global financial crisis -- 2.5 Has the TBTF problem become worse? -- 3. Some Notorious TBTF Cases -- 3.1 Continental Illinois -- 3.2 Long-Term Capital Management -- 3.3 The Royal Bank of Scotland -- 3.4 Northern Rock -- 3.5 American International Group -- 3.6 Citigroup -- 3.7 Lehman, Merrill and Bear -- 4. Far Too Big and Politically Connected -- 4.1 No longer humble intermediaries -- 4.2 Internalization and "King of the Mountain" -- 4.3 The quest for market power -- 4.4 Exploiting the economies of scale and scope -- 4.5 A reality check -- 4.6 The big motive: Mission TBTF -- 4.7 Growing big: A recap and evidence -- 4.8 The growing political influence of financial institutions -- 4.9 Victims or villains? -- 5. The Jewel in the Crown -- 5.1 Some facts and figures -- 5.2 Financial markets and financial engineering -- 5.3 The government's love affair with the financial sector -- 5.4 The role of deregulation -- 5.5 The role of academia -- 6. Worthy of Bailout: To be or Not to be? -- 6.1 Cherry picking? -- 6.2 Size as a determinant of systemic importance -- 6.3 Contagion as a determinant of systemic importance -- 6.4 Correlation as a determinant of systemic importance -- 6.5 Concentration as a determinant of systemic importance -- 6.6 Conditions/context as a determinant of systemic importance -- 6.7 A classification scheme -- 6.8 So, does size matter? -- 7. Why Too Big to Fail is Too Outrageous to Accept -- 7.1 Any argument for TBTF -- 7.2 Argument 1: The difficulty of determining TBTF institutions -- 7.3 Argument 2: Diversion of resources away from more beneficial uses -- 7.4 Argument 3: Boosting rent-seeking unproductive activities -- 7.5 Argument 4: TBTF creates significant moral hazard -- 7.6 Argument 5: Financial burden on future generations or hyperinflation -- 7.7 Argument 6: Saving a minority at the expense of the majority -- 7.8 Argument 7: Rewarding recklessness and hampering market discipline -- 7.9 Argument 8: TBTF as a source of poor performance -- 7.10 Argument 9: TBTF creates distortions -- 7.11 Argument 10: TBTF makes big institutions even bigger -- 7.12 Argument 11: Boosting the financial sector even further -- 7.13 Arguments against for all tastes -- 8. Dealing with the Menace of TBTF -- 8.1 Why TBTF should be tossed in the dustbin -- 8.2 The million dollar question -- 8.3 Fighting the obesity of financial institutions -- 8.4 Appropriate and effective regulation -- 8.5 Allowing failing financial institutions to fail -- 9. Forget about Basel II -- 9.1 Basel II in the aftermath of the global financial crisis -- 9.2 The Basel Accords -- 9.3 Basel II as a form of capital-based regulation -- 9.4 Basel II: The wrong kind of regulation -- 9.5 The treatment of liquidity and leverage -- 9.6 The use of internal models -- 9.7 Risk sensitivity and procyclicality -- 9.8 Reliance on rating agencies -- 9.9 The implementation problems -- 9.10 The exclusionary and discriminatory aspects of Basel II -- 9.11 The one-size-fits-all problem -- 9.12 Basel II as a pure compliance exercise -- 9.13 Concluding remarks -- 10. TBTF: Where Do We Stand? -- 10.1 The costs and benefits of TBTF -- 10.2 Circumventing the TBTF problem: Why and how? -- 10.3 Regulation: The way forward -- 10.4 No more business as usual -- 10.5 Basic finance without TBTF.