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Cheap talk when interests conflict

✍ Scribed by Joan B. Silk; Elizabeth Kaldor; Robert Boyd

Book ID: 112235551
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2000
Tongue: English
Weight: 150 KB
Volume: 59
Category: Article
ISSN: 0003-3472
DOI: 10.1006/anbe.1999.1312

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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