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Charity auctions with multiple goods: Bidding behavior and revenue

✍ Scribed by Vivienne Groves

Book ID: 116422843
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2011
Tongue: English
Weight: 166 KB
Volume: 111
Category: Article
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.007

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