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Characterizations of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Excludable versus Nonexcludable Public Projects

✍ Scribed by Shinji Ohseto

Book ID: 115611212
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2000
Tongue: English
Weight: 569 KB
Volume: 32
Category: Article
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0755

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