## Abstract In this paper we model and explain US macroeconomic outcomes subject to the discipline that monetary policy is set optimally. Exploiting the restrictions that come from optimal policymaking, we estimate the parameters in the Federal Reserve's policy objective function together with the
Chairman reappointments, presidential elections and policy actions of the federal reserve
โ Scribed by Caryl Ersenkal; Myles S. Wallace; John T. Warner
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1985
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 777 KB
- Volume
- 18
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0032-2687
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
A number of recent studies have analyzed whether there is a political influence on monetary policy, focusing primarily on whether monetary policy becomes "easier" just prior to elections. In addition to exploring whether there exists an election period cycle in monetary policy, this article explores the existence of another political influence on policy. Following up on some recent anecdotal evidence provided by John T. Woolley, this article explores whether incumbent FED chairmen have succeeded in influencing monetary policy in order to improve their reappointment chances. The analysis, which spans the administrations of seven U.S. presidents and four FED chairmen, finds no conclusive evidence that FED policy changes systematically either before elections or chairman reappointment dates. The analysis has implications for the issue of rules versus discretion in monetary policy. * The authors wish to thank William Shughart and Ryan Amacher for comments on a previous draft. The usual disclaimers apply.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
The Federal funds rate is also an ingredient in marc sophisticated measures of monetary policy as described in Bernankc and Mihov (1995) and Strongin (1995). Those measures also incorporate the volumc of nonborrowed and total reserves. 2See, for example, McGee (1995).