Centripetal forces in spatial voting: On the size of the Yolk

✍ Scribed by Scott L. Feld; Bernard Grofman; Nicholas Miller

• Book ID: 104628590
• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 1988
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 646 KB
• Volume: 59
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0048-5829
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00119448

✦ Synopsis

The yolk, the smallest circle which intersects all median lines, has been shown to be an important tool in understanding the nature of majority voting in a spatial voting context. The center of the yolk is a natural 'center' of the set of voter ideal points. The radius of the yolk can be used to provide bounds on the size of the feasible set of outcomes of sophisticated voting under standard amendment procedure, and on the limits of agenda manipulation and cycling when voting is sincere. We show that under many plausible conditions the yolk can be expected to be small. Thus, majority rule processes in spatial voting games will be far better behaved than has commonly been supposed, and the possible outcomes of agenda manipulations will be generally constrained. This result was first conjectured by Tullock (1967).