Causality in the logic of decision

✍ Scribed by Patrick Maher

• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 1987
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 873 KB
• Volume: 22
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0040-5833
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00126389

✦ Synopsis

In recent years there has been an active debate between proponents of two different models of rational decision. One model is evidential decision theory, which is characterized by the fact that it holds the principle of maximizing expected utility to be appropriate whenever the states are probabilistically independent of the acts. The other model, causal decision theory, holds that the principle of maximizing expected utility is appropriate whenever the states are causally independent of the acts. The proponents of evidential decision theory include Richard Jeffrey and Ellery Eells, who claim that evidential decision theory has significant advantages over causal decision theory. In this paper I discuss the two main advantages which have been claimed for evidential decision theor3;, and show that in fact evidential decision theory does not possess either of these advantages.