As the title of the paper suggests I shall be interested, in this context, in looking into the following questions: 'In which way empirical evidence (supposing that there is such kind of evidence) alone can justify the acceptance of some general truths?' and 'Whether empirical evidence has any intrinsic evidential demerit for a general truth?' It is important to note here that by 'general truth' I do not mean 'empirical generalization', rather significantly, I intend to mean 'truth which is indispensable for describing the world with a certain sense of profundity and finality.' A general truth is sometimes called a metaphysical truth. Thus 'time has a measurable magnitude' is a general truth, while 'watches measure time' is not a general truth.
The distinction between empirical evidence and non-empirical evidence is generally accepted as valid, at least in the West, and this distinction alone can be the ground of a more widely accepted distinction between empirical knowledge and non-empirical knowledge. The distinction between empirical evidence and non-empirical evidence is more fundamental than the distinction between empirical knowledge and non-empirical knowledge. This can be understood from the fact that the following questions are always regarded as key questions about knowledge:
Can we actually know or truly believe some particular things on empirical evidence alone? Can we actually know or truly believe some general things on empirical evidence alone? Can we actually know or truly believe some particular things on non-empirical evidence alone? Can we actually know or truly believe some general things on non-empirical evidence alone?
No philosopher can remain neutral to any of these questions, and would try his best to give an affirmative or a negative answer to each