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Can a mixed strategy be stable in a finite population?

โœ Scribed by J. Maynard Smith


Book ID
108360408
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1988
Tongue
English
Weight
314 KB
Volume
130
Category
Article
ISSN
0022-5193

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Can Mixed Strategies be Stable in Asymme
โœ KEN BINMORE; LARRY SAMUELSON ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 2001 ๐Ÿ› Elsevier Science ๐ŸŒ English โš– 345 KB

Selten (1980, J. theor. Biol. 84, 93(N) /01) has shown that mixed strategies cannot be evolutionarily stable in asymmetric games. Because every interaction features some asymmetry, this result apparently precludes mixed strategies in an evolutionary setting. In Maynard Smith's Hawk}Dove game (1982,