Blameworthy Belief: A Study in Epistemic Deontologism

✍ Scribed by Nikolaj Nottelmann

Publisher: Springer
Year: 2007
Tongue: English
Leaves: 282
Series: Synthese Library
Edition: 1
Category: Library

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