Bargaining Theory

✍ Scribed by Peter Vanderschraaf

Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2023
Tongue: English
Leaves: 100
Series: Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy
Category: Library

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis

The Nash bargaining problem provides a framework for analyzing problems where parties have imperfectly aligned interests. This Element reviews the parts of bargaining theory most important in philosophical applications, and to social contract theory in particular. It discusses rational choice analyses of bargaining problems that focus on axiomatic analysis, according to which a solution of a given bargaining problem satisfies certain formal criteria, and strategic bargaining, according to which a solution results from the moves of ideally rational and knowledgeable claimants. Next, it discusses the conventionalist analyses of bargaining problems that focus on how members of a society can settle into bargaining conventions via learning and focal points. In the concluding section this Element discusses how philosophers use bargaining theory to analyze the social contract.

✦ Table of Contents

Cover
Title page
Copyright page
Bargaining Theory
Contents
1 Introduction
2 Motivating Problems
Chocolate Cake
Nash’s Traders
Braithwaite’s Neighboring Musicians
Hume’s Thirsty Individuals
3 Defining the Problem
3.1 Bargaining Problems Based upon the Motivating Examples
Chocolate Cake Problem
Trading Problem
Braithwaite Problem
Wine Division Problem
3.2 Convexity and Compactness
3.3 Dominance-Based Feasible Set Properties
3.4 Underlying Games of Bargaining Problems
4 Solution Concepts
5 Rational Choice Justifications of Solutions
5.1 Nash’s Axiomatic and Strategic Analyses
5.2 Alternative Axioms Related to Feasible Set Changes
5.3 Alternative Axioms Related to Adding and Removing Agents
5.4 Further Strategic Analyses
5.5 Lessons from the Rational Choice Program
6 Bargaining Conventions
7 The Nash Bargaining Problem as a Tool for Analyzing the Social Contract
Appendix: Braithwaite Ranking Simulations
References
Acknowledgments

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