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Bargaining power in repeated games

✍ Scribed by Lars Peter Østerdal

Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2005
Tongue: English
Weight: 155 KB
Volume: 49
Category: Article
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.07.001

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