Bank performance and executive compensation: a managerial discretion perspective

✍ Scribed by Michael L. Magnan; Sylvie St-onge

• Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
• Year: 1997
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 118 KB
• Volume: 18
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0143-2095
• DOI: 10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199708)18:7<573::aid-smj900>3.0.co;2-k

✦ Synopsis

This study investigates how the relationship between bank performance and executive compensation is affected by the degree of an executive's managerial discretion. Managerial discretion is captured by two industry-specific attributes: a bank's strategic domain, and its regulatory environment. Executive compensation is found to be more related to bank performance in a context of high managerial discretion than in a context of low managerial discretion.