Bank monitoring, managerial ownership and Tobin's Q: an empirical analysis for India
✍ Scribed by Saibal Ghosh
- Book ID
- 102499953
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2007
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 276 KB
- Volume
- 28
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0143-6570
- DOI
- 10.1002/mde.1315
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
Abstract
The paper examines how banking relationships and managerial ownership relate to firm valuation. It is argued that both the number of banking relationships (which serves as an external monitoring function) and managerial ownership (which serves as an internal monitoring function) affect firm value, while internal monitoring by managers and external monitoring by banks were viewed as substitutes or complements. After controlling for the effect of exogenous variables, the results reveal the existence of a complementary monitoring effect between banks and the managerial group. On the other hand, the results indicate that increased external monitoring by banks will simultaneously raise the incentive on the part of managers to engage in internal monitoring. Also, firm valuation is found to be a significant determinant of managerial ownership. A disaggregated analysis of firms according to size and leverage suggests the existence of a complementary monitoring effect between banks and managers, except for small‐sized firms. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.