## Abstract This article examines the effect of disappointment aversion on futures hedging. We incorporated a constant‐absolute‐risk‐aversion (CARA) utility function into the disappointment‐aversion framework of Gul (1991). It is shown that a more disappointment‐averse hedger will choose an optimal
Aversion to risk and guilt
✍ Scribed by Francesco Mancini; Amelia Gangemi
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2004
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 74 KB
- Volume
- 11
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 1063-3995
- DOI
- 10.1002/cpp.418
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
Abstract
Much research has shown that cognitive processes are largely guided by individuals' states of mind (Mancini & Gangemi, 2002a, in press; Smeets, de Jong, & Mayer, 2000). In this paper, we specifically consider a state of mind characterized by guilt for having acted irresponsibly. This state is currently considered the breeding ground for the obsessive–compulsive disorder (Rachman, 2002; Salkovskis & Forrester, 2002). Our aim is to examine the impact of this state of mind on decision under risk. We hypothesize that individuals' choices (risk seeking/risk aversion) depend on how they evaluate themselves, as guilty or as victims of a wrong, and thus on moral values. People who evaluate them‐selves as guilty are expected to show a risk‐averse preference. People who evaluate themselves as victims are expected to show a risk‐seeking preference. In two different experiments, we demonstrated that non‐clinical participants' aversion to risky choices and preference for risky choices vary as a function of their moral role (guilty/victim). As predicted, in both the experiments, participants experienced intolerance for risk, making more riskless choices, in the context of guilt. Thus, aversion to risk‐taking is actually affected by a mental state of guilt. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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