<p>16. The General Subject Matter of Husserl's Phenomenology 45 17. General Thesis and Epoche 46 18. Doubt 47 19. Hyle and Noema 48 49 BIBLIOGRAPHY TRANSLATION OF SELECI'ED TEXTS REFERRED TO IN THE FOOTNOTES 51 INTRODUCTION SECTION I PREFACE Meinong was one of the great philosophers who stand at the
Austrian Phenomenology: Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object
β Scribed by Robin D. Rollinger
- Publisher
- De Gruyter
- Year
- 2008
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 339
- Series
- Phenomenology & Mind; 12
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
While many of the phenomenological currents in philosophy allegedly utilize a peculiar method, the type under consideration here is characterized by Franz Brentanoβs ambition to make philosophy scientific by adopting no other method but that of natural science. Brentano became particularly influential in teaching his students (such as Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, and Edmund Husserl) his descriptive psychology, which is concerned with mind as intentionally directed at objects. As Brentano and his students continued in their investigations in descriptive psychology, another side of Austrian phenomenology, namely object theory, became more and more prominent. The philosophical orientation under consideration in this collection of essays is accordingly a two-sided discipline, concerned with both mind and objects, and applicable to various areas of philosophy such as epistemology, philosophy of language, value theory, and ontology.
β¦ Table of Contents
CONTENTS
PREFACE
INTRODUCTION
1. The Subject Matter of Austrian Phenomenology
2. The Method of Austrian Phenomenology
3. Austrian Phenomenology and Philosophy
4. Major Figures of Austrian Phenomenology
BRENTANO AND HUSSERL ON IMAGINATION
1. Introduction
2. Brentano on Imagination
3. Husserl on Imagination
3.1. Methodological Considerations
3.2. Presentations
3.3. Sensations and Phantasms
3.4. The Phantasy Image
3.5. Phantasy Presentations as Intuitive
3.6. Critique of the Doctrine of Original Association
4. Conclusion
NAMES, STATEMENTS, AND MIND-FUNCTIONS IN HUSSERL'S LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS
1. Introduction
2. Manifestation, Meaning, and Reference
3. Positing Names and Non-Positing Statements
4. Excursus: Inner Perception in the Logical Investigations
5. Fulfillment of Names and Statements
6. Concluding Remarks
MARTY ON LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS AND MIND-FUNCTIONS
1. Introduction
2. Ontological Requirements
3. Mind-Functions in Correlation with Linguistic Expressions
4. Mentalism and Introspectionism
5. Conclusion
HUSSERL'S ELEMENTARY LOGIC: THE 1896 LECTURES IN THEIR NINETEENTH CENTURY CONTEXT
1. Introduction
3. Logic as Theory of Science
3. Concepts
4. Propositions
5. Inferences
6. Conclusion
MEINONG ON THE OBJECTS OF SENSATION
1. Introduction
2. Brentano on Sensory Contents
3. From Physical Phenomena to Objects of Sensation
4. Sensory Objects of Higher Order
5. The Nonexistence of Sensory Objects
6. A Priori Knowledge about Sensory Objects
7. Comparison with Stumpf
8. Comparison with Husserl
9. Conclusion
STUMPF ON PHENOMENA AND PHENOMENOLOGY
1. Introduction
2. Phenomena
3. Phenomenology
4. Conclusion
BRENTANO AND MEINONG
1. Introduction
2. Points of Divergence
2.1. Theory of Relations
2.2. Intensity
2.3. Immediate Evidence of Surmise
2.4. Feeling and Desire
2.5. Content and Object
2.6. Judgments
2.7. Presentations
2.8. Time-Consciousness
2.9. Assumptions
2.10. Object Theory
2.11. Value Theory
2.12. Phenomena and Consciousness
3. Philosophical Affinity
HUSSERL AND CORNELIUS: PHENOMENOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND EPISTEMOLOGY
1. Introduction
2. Hans Cornelius (1863-1947)
3. Husserl's Critique of Attempt at a Theory of Existential Judgments
3.1 Various Types of Problems concerning Judgments
3.2 Perceiving and Distinguishing
3.3 Content, Object, and Meaning
3.4 Phantasms and Sensations
3.5 Memory Images
3.6. Negation
4. Husserl's Critique of Psychology as an Experiential Science
4.1 The Principle of Thought Economy
4.2 Abstraction and General Ideas
4.3 The Experiential Origin of Universally Valid Judgments
5. Cornelius' Reply and Correspondence with Husserl
5.1 Psychology and Epistemology
5.2 Correspondence
5.3. The Subject Matter of Phenomenology
6. Conclusion
MEINONG ON PERCEPTION AND OBJECTIVES
AUSTRIAN THEORIES OF JUDGMENT: BOLZANO, BRENTANO, MEINONG, AND HUSSERL
1. Introduction
2. Bolzano
3. Brentano
4. Meinong
5. Husserl
6. Concluding Remarks
THE CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY IN STUMPF'S EPISTEMOLOGY
1. Introduction
2. Stumpfβs Epistemology
3. The Concept of Causality in British Empiricism
4. Inwardly Perceived Causality
5. Necessity in Natural Causal Laws
6. The External World and Causality
7. Causality in Inorganic Nature
8. Causality in Organic Nature
9. Psycho-Physical Causality
10. Psychical Causality
11. Conclusion
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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