Cover
Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method
Copyright
Dedication
Preface
Contents
1: Austin's Critical Method
I A Skeptical Argument
II Some Remarks about the Pretensions and Workings of the Argument
III Austin's Way with the Argument
IV The Consensus: Austin's Appeal to Ordinary Practice is Misguided
V Austin Misread
VI Austin's Actual Brief
VII The Nature of the Evidence to which Austin Appeals
VIII The "Snag of Divergent Usage"
IX The Problem of Pragmatics
X The Appeal to Philosophical Detachment
XI The Appeal to Intuitions. XII Two Kinds of Freedom to TheorizeXIII The Work Left to Do
2: Austin as Theorist
I The Mistake of Thinking of Austin as an Anti-Philosopher
II Austin on the Nature of Knowledge
III If You Know, You Can't Be Wrong
IV The Four Worries about Austin's Account of Knowledge
V Special Reasons
VI The Charge of Over-Intellectualization
VII The Missing "in Virtue" Account
VIII The Argument from Ignorance
3: Philosophical Detachment Revisited
I Looking for a Route between the Horns
II The Plane-Spotters
III Understanding Human Knowledge in General
IV The Nature of Experience. V Explaining How It's Possible for You to Know Anything about a SubjectVI The Tug of the Dream Argument
VII Pragmatics Revisited
VIII A More Ecumenical Attempt
IX The Challenge that Remains
4: How to Do Things with Austin: The Lottery and the Preface
I The Requirement of Deductive Cogency
II The Confidence Threshold Requirement
III Why the Threshold Requirement Can't Be Correct, Part I
IV Why the Threshold Requirement Can't Be Correct, Part II
V Two Senses of "Believe": The Lottery Paradox Dissolved
VI The Preface: Saying It's All True
VII The Preface: A Matter of Modesty. VIII The Preface: Saying the ImprobableIX A Worry about Downstream Consequences
X The Worry about Downstream Consequences Addressed, Part I
XI The Worry about Downstream Consequences Addressed, Part II
XII Coming to Terms with Our Human Fallibility
5: How to Do Things with Austin: Gettier's Challenge
I Is it Important to Decide What You Know?
II Knowledge and Evidence
III Justified Belief and Evidence
IV Why Justified Belief Isn't Evidence
V Why Justified True Belief Isn't Evidence
VI The Methodological Import of Gettier's Case. VII A Case that hasn't the Methodological Import of Gettier'sVIII A Moral about Experimental Epistemology
IX Moral Reinforced: The Pragmatic Encroachment Thesis
6: Epistemology Austin's Way
Appendix: A Brief Exercise in Product Differentiation
Bibliography
Index.