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Arrow's theorem with social quasi-orderings

✍ Scribed by John A. Weymark

Publisher: Springer US
Year: 1984
Tongue: English
Weight: 598 KB
Volume: 42
Category: Article
ISSN: 0048-5829
DOI: 10.1007/bf00124943

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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In 1951, K.J. Arrow proved that, under certain assumptions, it is impossible to have group decisionmaking rules that satisfy reasonable conditions like symmetry. This Impossibility Theorem is often cited as a proof that reasonable group decision-making is impossible. We start our article by remarkin