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Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning

✍ Scribed by Walton, Douglas


Publisher
Taylor and Francis
Year
2013
Tongue
English
Leaves
233
Category
Library

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✦ Synopsis


Cover; Title Page; Original Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication; Table of Contents; Preface; CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION; Need for a Systematic Study; Aristotle's Topics; Informal Fallacies; How are Schemes Normatively Binding?; Practical Reasoning; Plausible Reasoning; Argumentation Schemes and Themes; CHAPTER TWO: PRE SUMPTIVE REASONING; Received Views of Presumption; Introduction to Nonmonotonic Reasoning; Burden of Proof; Commitment and Burden Shifting; Speech Act Conditions Defining Presumption; Presumptions and Presuppositions; Testimony, Presumption and Fallacies.;Recent concerns with the evaluation of argumentation in informal logic and speech communication center around nondemonstrative arguments that lead to tentative or defeasible conclusions based on a balance of considerations. Such arguments do not appear to have structures of the kind traditionally identified with deductive and inductive reasoning, but are extremely common and are often called ""plausible"" or ""presumptive, "" meaning that they are only provisionally acceptable even when they are correct. How is one to judge, by some clearly defined standard, whether such arguments are correct o.

✦ Table of Contents


Cover
Title Page
Original Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
Preface
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Need for a Systematic Study
Aristotle's Topics
Informal Fallacies
How are Schemes Normatively Binding?
Practical Reasoning
Plausible Reasoning
Argumentation Schemes and Themes
CHAPTER TWO: PRE SUMPTIVE REASONING
Received Views of Presumption
Introduction to Nonmonotonic Reasoning
Burden of Proof
Commitment and Burden Shifting
Speech Act Conditions Defining Presumption
Presumptions and Presuppositions
Testimony, Presumption and Fallacies. Introduction to the Fallacy of Secundum QuidThe Practical Nature of Presumption
Implications for Argumentation and Fallacies
CHAPTER THREE: THE ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES
Argument from Sign
Argument from Example
Argument from Verbal Classification
Argument from Commitment
Circumstantial Argument Against the Person
Argument from Position to Know
Argument from Expert Opinion
Argument from Evidence to a Hypothesis
Argument from Correlation to Cause
Argument from Cause to Effect
Argument from Consequences
Argument from Analogy
Argument from Waste
Argument from Popularity. Ethotic ArgumentArgument from Bias
Argument from an Established Rule
Argument from Precedent
Argument from Gradualism
The Causal Slippery Slope Argument
The Precedent Slippery Slope Argument
Argument from Vagueness of a Verbal Classification
Argument from Arbitrariness of a Verbal Classification
The Verbal Slippery Slope Argument
The Full Slippery Slope Argument
CHAPTER FOUR: ARGUMENT FROM IGNORANCE
Four Cases
Argument from Ignorance as Presumptive Reasoning 1
Contexts of Dialogue
A Reasonable Kind of Argument
What Counts as an Argument from Ignorance? The Negative Logic of Argumentum ad I gnorantiamWhen is it Fallacious?
Related Fallacies
Fallacies and Blunders
Concluding Remarks
CHAPTER FIVE: IGNORING QUALIFICATIONS
Terminology and Classification
Accident and Converse Accident
The Raw Meat Example
Aristotle's Account
Historical Developments
Nonmonotonic Reasoning Again
A Model Treatment
Dynamic Reasoning
Protagorean Relativism
Conclusions
CHAPTER SIX: ARGUMENT FROM CONSEQUENCES
The Claim that it is Fallacious
Views of the Amsterdam School
Practical and Discursive Reasoning. Pragma-dialectical Nature of Argument from ConsequencesAppropriate Dialectical Situations
Consequences of Putting Forward a Point of View
Dialectical Structure of Argument from Consequences
Subfallacies of Argumentum ad Consequentiam
Related Fallacies
The Project of Evaluation
REFEREN C E S.

✦ Subjects


Presupposition;Reasoning;Hypothesis;Electronic books


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