The evolutionary form of the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) is a repeated game where players strategically choose whether to cooperate with or exploit opponents and reproduce in proportion to game success. It has been widely used to study the evolution of cooperation among sel"sh agents. In the p
β¦ LIBER β¦
Are There Really "No Duties to Oneself"?
β Scribed by Daniel Kading
- Book ID
- 124705112
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Year
- 1960
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 111 KB
- Volume
- 70
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0014-1704
- DOI
- 10.2307/2379335
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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## Abstract A couple of years ago commissioning an activityβbased costing (ABC) project could have meant armies of cost accountants locking themselves away in darkened rooms for months on end before any meaningful results were generated, only to have them summarily dismissed by line managers as bei