We give an axiomatization for Qualified Majority Voting Rules where one of the alternative is socially chosen if it obtains the support of 100 โข q% of the non-abstaining voters for some q โ ]0, 1[. These voting rules do not satisfy Neutrality in general. Instead, we introduce the axiom of Coalition
โฆ LIBER โฆ
Are qualified majority rules special?
โ Scribed by Shmuel Nitzan; Jacob Paroush
- Book ID
- 104631546
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1984
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 628 KB
- Volume
- 42
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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