Anti-Individualism and Knowledge

✍ Scribed by Jessica Brown

• Publisher: The MIT Press
• Year: 2004
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 355
• Series: Contemporary Philosophical Monographs
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by anti- individualism, which holds that a subject's thoughts are determined not only by what is inside her head but also by aspects of her environment. Despite its dominance, anti-individualism is subject to a daunting array of epistemological objections: that it is incompatible with the privileged access each subject has to her thoughts, that it undermines rationality, and, absurdly, that it provides a new route to a priori knowledge of the world. In this rigorous and persuasive study, Jessica Brown defends anti- individualism from these epistemological objections. The discussion has important consequences for key epistemological issues such as skepticism, closure, transmission, and the nature of knowledge and warrant. According to Brown's analysis, one main reason for thinking that anti-individualism is incompatible with privileged access is that it undermines a subject's introspective ability to distinguish types of thoughts. So diagnosed, the standard focus on a subject's reliability about her thoughts provides no adequate reply. Brown defuses the objection by appeal to the epistemological notion of a relevant alternative. Further, she argues that, given a proper understanding of rationality, anti- individualism is compatible with the notion that we are rational subjects. However, the discussion of rationality provides a new argument that anti-individualism is in tension with Fregean sense. Finally, Brown shows that anti-individualism does not create a new route to a priori knowledge of the world. While rejecting solutions that restrict the transmission of warrant, she argues that anti-individualists should deny that we have the type of knowledge that would be required to use a priori knowledge of thought content to gain a priori knowledge of the world.

✦ Table of Contents

Preface......Page 10
1 Anti-Individualism......Page 16
1 Content and the Environment......Page 17
2 Natural Kind Anti-Individualism......Page 24
3 Singular Anti-Individualism......Page 28
4 Illusions of Thought......Page 30
5 Social Anti-Individualism......Page 32
6 Fregean and Non-Fregean Anti-Individualism......Page 35
7 APriori and Empirical......Page 37
8 Outline of the Book......Page 40
1 Privileged Access......Page 48
2 The Discrimination Argument......Page 52
3 Discrimination and Reliability......Page 60
4 Knowledge and Reliability......Page 74
5 Other Compatibilist Responses—Falvey and Owens, and McLaughlin and Tye......Page 79
6 Conclusion......Page 86
1 Introduction......Page 90
2 Evans’s Account of Singular Thought......Page 92
3 Evans and the Discrimination Argument......Page 98
4 Perceptual Demonstrative Thoughts......Page 101
5 Possible Compatibilist Responses......Page 105
6 Recognition-based Thoughts......Page 111
7 Comparison of Evans’s Account and the Modified Account......Page 121
8 Conclusion......Page 125
1 Introduction......Page 128
2 Relevance and Reliability......Page 132
3 Two Notions of Reliability......Page 134
4 Local or Global Reliability?......Page 139
5 The Illusion Argument Reconsidered......Page 144
6 Conclusion of the Illusion Argument......Page 148
7 The Illusion and Discrimination Arguments......Page 150
8 Social Anti-Individualism and Twin Situations......Page 153
9 Natural Kind Anti-Individualism and Twin Situations......Page 157
10 Singular Anti-Individualism and Twin Situations......Page 160
11 No-Reference Situations......Page 162
12 The Relevance Strategy and Alternatives......Page 167
13 Conclusion of Chapters 2 through 4......Page 170
1 Introduction......Page 172
2 Transparency of Sameness of Content......Page 176
3 Transparency of Difference of Content......Page 181
4 Slow Switch and Conceptual Change......Page 185
5 Two Concepts and Inference......Page 191
6 Rationality and A Priority......Page 197
7 Conclusion......Page 206
1 Introduction......Page 208
2 The Contrast between Fregean and Non-Fregean Anti-Individualism......Page 212
3 Fregean Anti-Individualism and Transparency of Sameness......Page 219
4 Fregean Anti-Individualism and Transparency of Difference......Page 225
5 Fregean Anti-Individualism......Page 240
1 Introduction......Page 248
2 Closure and Transmission......Page 254
3 Wright and Conditional Warrant......Page 259
4 Begging the Question......Page 273
5 Warrant and Ruling Out Alternatives......Page 274
6 Conclusion......Page 284
1 Introduction......Page 286
2 Natural Kind Anti-Individualism......Page 289
3 Singular Anti-Individualism......Page 304
4 Social Anti-Individualism......Page 309
5 Combined Views......Page 315
6 Conclusion......Page 316
Appendix to Chapter 8: Comparison with Davies and Wright......Page 318
9 Conclusion......Page 324
Notes......Page 328
References......Page 342
Index......Page 350