Another look at the strategic petroleum reserve: Should its oil holdings be privatized?
✍ Scribed by Carl Blumstein; Paul Komor
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 1996
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 386 KB
- Volume
- 15
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0276-8739
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
The sharp increases in crude oil prices that occurred in 1973-1974 and in 1978-1979 unleashed a veritable gusher of economic and policy analyses concerning energy security [for a recent review, see Toman, 19931. Although these analyses by no means resolved all of the outstanding issues, something of a consensus emerged concerning the desirability of building and using a large stock of oil to cushion the effects of a sudden loss of oil supply [Hogan, 19831. No one argued that an oil stockpile would eliminate U.S. dependence on foreign oil. Rather, it was expected that a stockpile would provide a buffer against short-term disruptions in supply. In times of disruption, releases from the stockpile would militate against sharp price increases. This would buy time during which the conditions causing the disruption might dissipate or adjustments in the economy could occur that would increase supply and reduce demand. The overarching purpose for an oil stockpile would be to reduce the adverse macroeconomic impacts that can result from oil price shocks.' The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), established in 1976, was seen as the instrument for achieving these policy goals.
Today the SPR consists of five storage facilities operated by the U.S. Depart-' Recently, the consensus on the need for strategic reserxc's to reduce potential adverse macroeconomic impacts of oil price shocks has begun to fray a little. Some observers question the strength of the relationship between oil price shocks and macroeconomic performance; they suggest that, however important the relationship may have been, it has been significantly weakened by changes in the oil market [see, e.g., Farmer, 19931.
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