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An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs

✍ Scribed by John Morgan; Felix Várdy

Book ID
116505627
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2004
Tongue
English
Weight
257 KB
Volume
49
Category
Article
ISSN
0899-8256

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Randomized strategy equilibrium in the action commitment game with costs of leading
✍ Toshihiro Matsumura; Takeshi Murooka; Akira Ogawa 📂 Article 📅 2011 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 200 KB

We investigate a two-player action commitment game where one simultaneous-move and two sequential-move pure strategy equilibria exist when the cost of leading is zero, while the simultaneousmove outcome is not an equilibrium when the leading cost is small positive. We show that this discontinuity di