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An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games

✍ Scribed by Andreas Blume; Uri Gneezy

Book ID
112257975
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2000
Tongue
English
Weight
112 KB
Volume
90
Category
Article
ISSN
0022-0531

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