Altruism, tit for tat and ‘outlaw’ genes
✍ Scribed by Lee Alan Dugatkin; David Sloan Wilson; Livingston Farrand; Richard T. Wilkens
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Year
- 1994
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 426 KB
- Volume
- 8
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0269-7653
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES
The evolution of cooperation requires either (a) nonrandom interactions, such that cooperators preferentially interact with other cooperators, or (b) conditional behaviors, such that individuals act cooperatively primarily towards other cooperators. Although these conditions can be met without assum
This paper demonstrates how a repeated public goods problem may be solved by using Tit-for-Tat (TFT) on the Lindahl point. The general solution is developed; geometric and numerical examples are offered.
Because of the distinct ability of retroviruses to integrate into the target cell genome and thus achieve long-term expression, retrovirus vectors hold great promise for stable gene transfer. Such vectors derived from human immunodeficiency retroviruses (HIVs) and other lentiviruses are envisioned t