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Allocation of prizes in asymmetric all-pay auctions

โœ Scribed by Chen Cohen; Aner Sela


Book ID
113590980
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2008
Tongue
English
Weight
325 KB
Volume
24
Category
Article
ISSN
0176-2680

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Harmful competition in all-pay auctions
โœ Domenico Menicucci ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 2009 ๐Ÿ› Elsevier Science ๐ŸŒ English โš– 686 KB

We consider an all-pay auction in a standard symmetric independent private value setting with a risk averse seller. We prove that if the distribution for the bidders' valuations attaches probability almost one to a single value, then the seller prefers that only two bidders participate in the auctio