Agent mobility and the evolution of cooperative communities
โ Scribed by Stephen J. Majeski; Greg Linden; Corina Linden; Aaron Spitzer
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 1999
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 874 KB
- Volume
- 5
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 1076-2787
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
An artificial world is constructed that is based upon a spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Several additional features are introduced into this model, the key feature being the ability of agents to move around in their world. Movement is a mechanism for exit or noncompulsory play. When agents can move, high levels of cooperation are achieved more frequently and are considerably more stable than when they cannot move. Also, when cooperative worlds occur, they are generated and sustained by the formation of networks of densely connected "cooperative" agents that can withstand invasion and parasitism by noncooperative agents.
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