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ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE: CAN DYNAMIC DATA HELP TO DISTINGUISH?

✍ Scribed by Jaap H. Abbring; James J. Heckman; Pierre-André Chiappori; Jean Pinquet

Book ID: 119984097
Publisher: MIT Press
Year: 2003
Tongue: English
Weight: 80 KB
Volume: 1
Category: Article
ISSN: 1542-4766
DOI: 10.1162/154247603322391152

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