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Adaptive learning in extensive form games and sequential equilibrium

✍ Scribed by Ebbe Groes; Hans Jørgen Jacobsen; Birgitte Sloth

Publisher: Springer
Year: 1999
Tongue: English
Weight: 209 KB
Volume: 13
Category: Article
ISSN: 0938-2259
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050244

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