In an interaction it is possible that one agent has features it is aware of but the opponent is not. These features (e.g. cost, valuation or fighting ability) are referred to as the agent's type. The paper compares two models of evolution in symmetric situations of this kind. In one model the type o
โฆ LIBER โฆ
Adaptive expectations and dynamic adjustment in noncooperative games with incomplete information
โ Scribed by A. Namatame; E. Tse
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 1981
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 956 KB
- Volume
- 34
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0022-3239
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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