Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary stability
โ Scribed by J. Hofbauer; K. Sigmund
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1990
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 380 KB
- Volume
- 3
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0893-9659
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
Adaptive dynamics describes the evolution of games where the strategies are continuous functions of some parameters. The standard adaptive dynamics framework assumes that the population is homogeneous at any one time. Di!erential equations point to the direction of the mutant that has maximum payo!
A stochastic process of long-term evolution due to mutation and selection is defined over an asexually reproducing population, with selection according to a population game with a one-dimensional continuity of pure strategies. Limiting the analysis to mutations of small effect, it is shown that long