Abelson's ‘refutation’ of mind-body identity

✍ Scribed by Stephen L. Nathanson

• Publisher: Springer Netherlands
• Year: 1972
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 116 KB
• Volume: 23
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0031-8116
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00354731

✦ Synopsis

Raziel Abelson has recently put forward an ingenious argument against the mind-body identity theory. 1 I want to argue that he fails to refute the theory.

According to the view which Abelson opposes, particular mental states -such as thoughts -are to be identified with particular brain states. He attempts to discredit this view by arguing that the number of thoughts which a person can have far exceeds the number of brain states available to him and, hence, that the two cannot be identical.

His argument can be formulated as follows :~