✦ LIBER ✦

A unique solution to n-person sequential bargaining

✍ Scribed by Geir B Asheim

Book ID: 116157387
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 1992
Tongue: English
Weight: 737 KB
Volume: 4
Category: Article
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(92)90013-i

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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Everyday bargaining problems are often solved by tossing a coin. A solution for two-person bargaining problems is axiomatized, which is a Paretooptimal generalization of this coin tossing method. The super-additive solution of Perles and Maschler is also shown to be a generalization of this method.