A Theory of Causation in the Social and Biological Sciences
โ Scribed by Alexander Reutlinger (auth.)
- Publisher
- Palgrave Macmillan UK
- Year
- 2013
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 285
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Table of Contents
Front Matter....Pages i-xii
Front Matter....Pages 1-1
Causation in the Special Sciences....Pages 3-24
The Interventionist Theory of Causation....Pages 25-70
Front Matter....Pages 71-71
Counterfactuals: A Problem for Interventionists?....Pages 73-103
Getting Rid of Interventions....Pages 104-124
Non-Universal Laws....Pages 125-145
Woodward Meets Russell: Does Causation Fit into the World of Physics?....Pages 146-174
Front Matter....Pages 175-175
In Defence of Conceptually Non-Reductive Explications of Causation....Pages 177-198
The Comparative Variability Theory of Causation....Pages 199-232
Consequences....Pages 233-251
Back Matter....Pages 252-276
โฆ Subjects
Philosophy of Science; Philosophy of the Social Sciences; Social Philosophy
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