## Abstract We construct a model of participation and bidding at multiβunit, sequential, clock auctions when bidders have multiβunit demand. We describe conditions sufficient to characterize a symmetric, perfectβBayesian equilibrium and then demonstrate that this equilibrium induces an efficient al
β¦ LIBER β¦
A sequential auction-bargaining procurement model
β Scribed by Woonghee Tim Huh; Kun Soo Park
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2009
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 486 KB
- Volume
- 57
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0894-069X
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