According to the AIR theory, which I endorse, a neural state is a conscious experience when and only when it is a representation in an intermediate-level, perceptual processing system that has been affected in an appropriate way by mechanism of attention. This is not intended as a revolutionary idea. Appeals to attention and to intermediate level representations both have a prominent place in recent work on consciousness, though they are not always brought together into a single account. As stated, however, the AIR theory is underspecified. Most obviously, it stands in need of a theory of attention, a theory of what ways of attentionally affecting intermediate representations count as appropriate. It is best construed as a placeholder that points to where I anticipate we will uncover a fully elaborated theory of how physical systems give rise to consciousness. Marcel (this issue) sees little promise in this starting place and asks a number of challenging questions. These questions offer a welcome opportunity to clarify and strengthen my case.
Reply to Commentaries on J. Prinz (2000). A neurofunctional theory of visual consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 9(2), 243-259. This article is part of a special issue of this journal on Metacognition and Consciousness, with Thomas O. Nelson and Georges Rey as Guest Editors.