A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate
β Scribed by Bengt Hansson; Henrik Sahlquist
- Book ID
- 115963991
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1976
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 454 KB
- Volume
- 13
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0022-0531
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
We characterize strategy-proof social choice functions when individuals have strictly quasi-concave, continuous and satiated utility functions on convex subsets of IR m, representing preferences for the provision of m pure public goods. When specialized to the case m = 1, these assumptions amount to
Let X be a random variable satisfying for some z =-0. \Ye denote by P ( x ) the distribution function, by f ( t ) the characteristic function of the random variable X and introduce such that l a / -= ~/ 3 because of (1). Further, we use the denotations